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Abstract
There is widespread evidence supporting the conjecture that borrowing
constraints have important implications for ﬁrm growth and survival. In this
paper we model a multi-period borrowing/lending relationship with asym-
metric information. We show that borrowing constraints emerge as a feature
of the optimal long-term lending contract, and that such constraints relax as
the value of the borrower’s claim to future cash-ﬂows increases. We also show
that the optimal contract has interesting implications for ﬁrm dynamics. In
agreement with the empirical evidence, as age and size increase, mean and
variance of growth decrease, ﬁrm survival increases, and the sensitivity of
investment to cash-ﬂows declines.
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1 Introduction.
There is considerable evidence suggesting that ﬁnancing constraints are important
determinants of ﬁrm dynamics.1 Such constraints may arise in connection to the
ﬁnancing of investment opportunities faced by ﬁrms or temporary liquidity needs,
such as those required to survive a recession. This paper develops a theory of
endogenous ﬁnancing constraints and studies its implications for ﬁrm growth and
survival. In our model, borrowing constraints arise as part of the optimal design of
a lending contract under asymmetric information.
The model is as follows. At time zero the borrower (entrepreneur) has a project
that requires a ﬁxed initial investment. Once in operation, the project yields rev-
enues that are subject to i.i.d. shocks and increase with the amount of working
capital advanced in the period. The project can be discontinued at anytime, pro-
viding a ﬁxed liquidation value. A lender ﬁnances the initial investment and provides
for working capital. Both the borrower and the lender are risk neutral and discount
future cash-ﬂows at the same rate. Informational asymmetries arise as the lender
cannot monitor either the use of funds or the outcome of the project. We study the
optimal dynamic contract subject to the incentive compatibility and limited liability
constraints.
The environment is chosen so that in the absence of asymmetric information, the
outcome is trivial: there exists an eﬃcient level of working capital which is advanced
every period. There is neither growth nor exit. In contrast, with asymmetric in-
formation the optimal contract determines non-trivial stochastic processes for ﬁrm
size (working capital invested), equity (the entrepreneur’s share of total ﬁrm value),
and debt (the lender’s share). These processes have two absorbing states: either the
ﬁrm is liquidated, or a point is reached where borrowing constraints cease to bind
and the ﬁrm attains its eﬃcient size.
1Fazzari, Hubbard and Peterson [15], Gilchrist and Himmelberg [18], and Whited [31] among
others, ﬁnd that at the ﬁrm level capital expenditures respond positively to innovations in the cash
ﬂow process, even after controlling for measures of the expected marginal return on investment.
Gertler and Gilchrist [17] argue that liquidity constraints may explain why small manufacturing
ﬁrms respond more to a tightening of monetary policy than do larger manufacturing ﬁrms. Perez-
Quiros and Timmermann [24] show that in recessions smaller ﬁrms are more sensitive to the
worsening of credit market conditions as measured by higher interest rates and default premia.
For surveys see Hubbard [21] and Stein [29].
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Revenue shocks aﬀect the ﬁnancial structure of the ﬁrm and thus have persis-
tent eﬀects on ﬁrm size, growth, and probability of survival. As in all models of
moral hazard, rewards and punishments serve to discipline the conduct of the en-
trepreneur. This explains why the value of equity (i.e. the expected discounted
value of the cash ﬂows accruing to the entrepreneur) increases with high revenue
shocks and decreases with low ones. Moreover, the spread between future contingent
equity values increases with the amount of working capital advanced. This mimics
the standard moral hazard problem of unobserved eﬀort, where higher sensitivity
of a worker’s compensation to output is needed if higher eﬀort is required. Due
to the interaction of limited liability and a concave proﬁt function, in our model
the total value of the ﬁrm is a concave function of the entrepreneur’s equity. As
a result, a spread in future equity is costly. This accounts for the borrowing con-
straints. A sequence of good shocks results in an increasing path for equity. As its
value approaches a threshold, working capital (ﬁrm size) eventually increases to the
unconstrained eﬃcient level. On the other hand, a suﬃciently long sequence of bad
shocks leads equity value to a region of liquidation. We ﬁnd that in the neighbor-
hood of this region risk taking is encouraged, and capital advancements can also be
larger.
In spite of its simplicity, the model seems to match most of the qualitative prop-
erties of ﬁrm dynamics that have been recently documented. In average, investment
(change in the working capital invested in the project) is sensitive to innovations
in the cash ﬂow process. This sensitivity decreases with age and size. Firm size
increases with age; survival increases with ﬁrm size; hazard rates for exit increase
initially and then decrease with the age of the ﬁrm; mean and variance of the growth
rate decrease with size and age.2
2All of these facts have been widely documented. Caves provides a comprehensive survey of the
literature. Gertler and Gilchrist [17] and Gilchrist and Himmelberg [18] ﬁnd that the sensitivity of
investment to cash-ﬂow is higher for smaller and younger ﬁrms. Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson
[13] and Troske [30] document the positive association between age and size. Evans [14], Hall
[20], and Troske [30] report the negative correlation between age, size, and the mean and variance
of growth. Evans [14] and Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson [12] provide evidence in favor of
the existence of the mentioned relationship between age, size, and survival probabilities. Finally,
Andretsch [5] and Baldwin [6] provide evidence that hazard rates are decreasing with age. Bruderl,
Preisendorfer, and Ziegler [9] are the only one able to measure hazard rates by month. They ﬁnd
that hazard rates increase for most of the ﬁrst year and decline thereafter.
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Incentive compatibility and limited liability constraints imply a set of feasible
debt/equity values. The Pareto frontier of this set deﬁnes implicitly the value of
equity as a decreasing function of debt. Values on the frontier can be implemented
by one-period contingent contracts and debt rollover. There is some debt forgiveness
when low shocks occur. The lender is compensated for this loss when high shocks are
realized. There is also a maximum sustainable debt, which corresponds to the lowest
value of equity on the Pareto frontier. Two possible cases can arise, depending on
whether this equity value is zero (the smallest feasible value) or greater than zero.
In the ﬁrst case, the contract is renegotiation-proof and the maximum level of debt
is equal to collateral of the project (i.e. its liquidation value). In the second case,
the maximum level of debt exceeds the value of the collateral. The ﬁrst case occurs
for high levels of liquidation value while the second occurs for low ones.
Our work builds on recent contributions by Gertler [16] and Bolton and Scharf-
stein [8]. Gertler [16] studies the optimal contract between a lender and a borrower
in a three-period production economy with asymmetric information. Similarly to
ours, in Gertler’s model the tradeoﬀ between current employment and ”ex-post ﬁ-
nancial position” induces borrowing constraints and investment-cash ﬂow sensitivity.
A shortcoming of this model, as pointed out by Gertler, ”is that it lies well short of
a fully dynamic framework to be matched to the data.” Our work is a move in that
direction and can be viewed as a dynamic extension of Gertler’s - with a minor dif-
ference in the timing of the allocation of capital. In addition, our model introduces
a positive liquidation value and derives implications for ﬁrm survival. Bolton and
Scharfstein [8] consider a two-period model with asymmetric information similar to
ours, but without a choice of scale. In their scenario, either the project is funded
or not. The threat of not providing funds in the second period (i.e. the threat of
liquidation) provides incentives for truthful reporting in the ﬁrst one. As in our
model, moral hazard can lead to ineﬃcient liquidation.
The two studies that are most closely related to ours are working papers by
DeMarzo and Fishman [11] and Quadrini [25]. Both of these papers consider op-
timal long-term lending contracts in environments characterized by asymmetric in-
formation. DeMarzo and Fishman [11] focus on the implementation of the long-
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term arrangement by means of simple contracts, while Quadrini [25] characterizes
renegotiation-proof contracts.
The eﬀects of moral hazard on investment when long-term lending contracts
are allowed, have also been investigated by Atkeson [3] and Marcet and Marimon
[23]. Atkeson shows that asymmetric information and limited enforcement consid-
erations can explain why developing countries experience capital outﬂows when hit
by bad idiosyncratic shocks. Marcet and Marimon study the eﬀects of the same
imperfections on capital accumulation.
In recent work, Albuquerque and Hopenhayn [1] study lending and ﬁrm dynam-
ics in a model with limited enforcement. In spite of the similarities between our
approach and theirs, some of the implications are radically diﬀerent. To illustrate
this point, Section 9 considers a variant of our model where moral hazard is replaced
by incomplete enforcement. In contrast to the moral hazard case, the entrepreneur’s
equity and ﬁrm size never decrease and there is no exit.
Our model is one of repeated moral hazard. The recursive representation that
we use was developed by Green [19] and Spear and Srivastava [28]. The pioneering
work in the area goes back to Radner [26] and Rogerson [27].
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The model is introduced in
Section 2. In Section 3 we characterize the main properties of the optimal contract.
In particular, we describe the optimal capital advancement and repayment policies,
and the evolution of equity over time as implied by the contract. The implications
for ﬁrm growth survival are described in Section 4. In Section 5 we consider the im-
plementation of the optimal lending contract by means of short-term loans. Section
6 discusses the role of collateral. In Section 7 we consider the ﬁnancial feasibility
of the optimal contract. Section 8 shows that there is an equivalent formulation
if it is the use of funds, rather than realized revenues, that cannot be monitored.
In Section 9 we provide the comparison with the incomplete enforcement model.
Section 10 concludes.
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2 The Model.
Time is discrete and the time horizon is inﬁnite. At time zero the entrepreneur has a
project which requires a ﬁxed initial investment I0 > 0 and a per-period investment
of working capital. Let kt be the amount of working capital invested in the project
- its scale - in period t . The project is successful with probability p, in which
case the entrepreneur collects revenues R(kt). If the project fails, revenues are zero.
We assume that the function R is continuous, uniformly bounded from above, and
strictly concave. At the beginning of every period the project can be liquidated.
The liquidation generates a scrap value S.
We assume that the lender cannot observe the revenue outcome. In other words,
such outcome is private information for the entrepreneur.3
The entrepreneur’s net worth is given by M < I0. Therefore, to undertake the
project, he requires a lender (bank) to ﬁnance part of the initial setup cost and
the project investments in every period. We assume that in every period the en-
trepreneur is liable for payments to the lender only to the extent of current revenues.
Therefore the ﬁrm is restricted at all times to a nonnegative cash ﬂow.4
Both the borrower and the lender are risk neutral, discount ﬂows using the same
discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1), and are able to commit to a long term contract.
We model the relation between the bank and the entrepreneur as a message
game. At time 0 the bank makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the entrepreneur. The
oﬀer consists of a contract whose terms can be contingent on all public information.
Let θ be a Bernoulli random variable, with θ ∈ Θ ≡ {H,L} and prob{θ = H} = p.
Revenues are positive (and equal to R(k)) when θ = H, and identically zero when
θ = L. We invoke the Revelation Principle to reduce the message space to the set
Θ. Thus a reporting strategy for the entrepreneur is given by θˆ = {θˆt(θt)}∞t=1, where
θt = (θ1, ..., θt).
The dynamic contract speciﬁes cash-ﬂow and liquidation policies which are con-
tingent on all information provided by the agent. Letting ht = (θˆ1, ..., θˆt) denote the
history of reports of the agent, the contract σ = {αt(ht−1), Qt(ht−1), kt(ht−1), τt(ht)}
3An alternative formulation where revenue is observable but the use of funds (or investment)
cannot be monitored is considered in section 8. The two formulations turn out to be equivalent.
4This assumption can be easily relaxed to a lower bound.
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speciﬁes a contingent policy of liquidation probabilities αt, transfers Qt from the
lender to the entrepreneur (in case of liquidation), capital advancements kt and
transfers τt from the entrepreneur to the lender (in case of no liquidation).
The timing is the same at every information node (i.e. after every history ht) and
is described in Figure 1. At the beginning of the period, the lender has the chance
of liquidating the project. The contract dictates that he will do so with probability
αt(h
t−1). In case liquidation occurs, the entrepreneur is compensated with a value
Qt(h
t−1), while the lender receives S−Qt(ht−1). If the project is not liquidated, the
lender provides the entrepreneur with capital kt(h
t−1). Thereafter, the entrepreneur
observes the revenue realization and makes a report to the lender. The lender will
require a transfer τt(h
t), where ht = (ht−1, θˆt).






❅
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅❘
✲
Continue
1− αt(ht−1)
αt(ht−1)
Liquidate
Lender advances kt(ht−1)
❄

Nature
draws θt
✻

Entrepreneur
reports θˆt
✻

Entrepreneur pays τt(ht−1, θˆt)
❄

Entrepreneur receives Qt(ht−1)
Lender receives S −Qt(ht−1)
Figure 1: The Timing.
At every time t, conditional on success, the entrepreneur will receive a net cash-
ﬂow R(kt)− τt. We assume, without loss of generality, that these resources are fully
consumed by the entrepreneur (i.e. not reinvested in the business venture).5 As
a consequence, the nonnegativity constraint on entrepreneur’s cash-ﬂows requires
that τt ≤ R(kt). When the project fails no payments are made to the bank. We are
5Alternatively, we might allow the entrepreneur to save and assume that the bank can observe
the return on his wealth and monitor the size of the project.
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now in the position to provide our deﬁnition of feasible contract.
Definition 1 A contract σ is feasible if ∀ t ≥ 1 and ∀ ht−1 ∈ Θt−1
(i) αt(h
t−1) ∈ [0, 1],
(ii) Qt(h
t−1) ≥ 0,
(iii) τt(h
t−1, H) ≤ R(kt(ht−1)),
(iv) τt(h
t−1, L) ≤ 0.
After every history ht−1, the contract and reporting strategies (σ, θˆ) imply ex-
pected discounted cash ﬂows for the entrepreneur and the lender. Denote such
values as Vt(σ, θˆ, h
t−1) and Bt(σ, θˆ, ht−1), respectively. These also correspond to
the values of equity and debt.
Definition 2 A contract σ is incentive compatible if ∀ θˆ, V1(θ,σ, h0) ≥ V1(θˆ,σ, h0).
Now deﬁne the set V ≡ {V | ∃ σ s.t. (feas), (ic) and V1 [σ,θ, h0] = V } . V is
the set of equity values that can be generated by feasible and incentive compatible
contracts.6 For any V ∈ V, an optimal contract maximizes the value obtained by the
lender (and thus total value) among all incentive compatible and feasible contracts
that deliver the entrepreneur an initial value V. This deﬁnes a frontier of values
B (V ) = sup{B | ∃ σ s.t. V1
[
σ,θ, h0
]
= V and B1
[
σ,θ, h0
]
= B}.
Every point on the frontier corresponds to a capital structure (V,B (V )). The
corresponding total value W (V ) is a function of the capital structure, as W (V ) =
V + B (V ). In the remainder of this paper we characterize the set of contracts
yielding values on the frontier.
2.1 A Benchmark: Contracts under Symmetric Informa-
tion.
As a ﬁrst step, it is useful to consider the case of symmetric information, where the
lender observes the revenue realizations and can write contracts contingent on them.
Since the two agents discount cash ﬂows at the same rate, the optimal contract
6As shown below, there is an incentive compatible and feasible contract for any V ≥ 0.
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will maximize the total expected discounted proﬁts for the match. This result
is achieved by having the lender provide the entrepreneur with the unconstrained
eﬃcient amount of capital in every period.
The unconstrained eﬃcient capital advancement is given by k∗ ≡ argmax
k
pR (k)−
k and implies a per-period total surplus π∗ ≡ max
k
pR (k)− k. Then, the total sur-
plus is given by W˜ ≡ π∗
1−δ . Undertaking the project is optimal as long as W˜ > I0.
Once started, the ﬁrm will never grow, shrink, or exit. Any division of the surplus W˜
among the lender and the entrepreneur is feasible, provided that the latter obtains
a nonnegative value.
2.2 The Contract with Private Information: a Recursive
Representation.
In any lending contract, the evolution of equity satisﬁes the following accounting
identity:
Vt = p (R (kt)− τt) + δ
[
pV Ht+1 + (1− p)V Lt+1
]
, (1)
where the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side corresponds to expected dividends and
the second to the expected continuation value. The quantities V Ht+1 and V
L
t+1 are the
continuation values contingent on high and low report, respectively. Equation (1)
suggests a tradeoﬀ in the assignment of values over time and across states. These
are precisely the margins considered in the optimal contract design.
The above observations also suggest a recursive representation of the optimum
problem deﬁned in the previous section.7 The state variable for the problem is the
entrepreneur’s value entitlement at the beginning of a period, V . The ﬁrst choice
to be made is whether to liquidate the project, obtaining the value S, or keep it in
operation.
We start by deﬁning the total value of the ﬁrm in case the project continues. The
ﬂow equation (1) becomes now a constraint, as the initial value V must be delivered
7Green [19] and Spear and Srivastava [28] were the ﬁrst to show that, under mild boundedness
conditions, there exists a recursive formulation for the maximization problem faced by the principal
in models of repeated moral hazard. Such conditions hold in our case. We decide to omit the proof
of equivalence between the sequence problem and the recursive problem, because it consists of the
mere application of the techniques used by Atkeson and Lucas [4], among the others.
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to the entrepreneur by the continuation contract. Suppressing time subscripts, this
gives:
V = p (R(k)− τ) + δ [pV H + (1− p)V L] . (2)
As usual, the only relevant incentive constraint is the one imposing truthful
reporting in the high state:
R (k)− τ + δV H ≥ R (k) + δV L.
By reporting truthfully, the entrepreneur obtains dividends R (k)− τ in the current
period and a continuation value V H . By reporting a low state, the agent avoids
making any repayment and thus increases dividends at a cost of a lower continuation
value. The incentive compatibility condition can be rewritten as
τ ≤ δ (V H − V L) . (3)
Finally, the limited liability constraint requires that
τ ≤ R(k). (4)
A continuation value V i (i = H,L) must be supported by a feasible continuation
contract. Any positive continuation value V i ≥ 0 is feasible, as it can be imple-
mented by giving the entrepreneur no capital and a transfer equal to V i, and then
liquidating the project. Any continuation value V i < 0 is not feasible, for it would
violate the limited liability constraint (4) in some future period. Hence, a value V
can be supported by a feasible contract if and only if V ≥ 0 .
We denote ﬁrm value contingent upon continuation as Ŵ . This is diﬀerent from
the value of the ﬁrm prior to the liquidation decision, which is denoted as W . The
choice variables are the capital advancement for the period k, the repayment τ , and
the contingent continuation values V H and V L. The value Ŵ (V ) is given by
Ŵ (V ) = max
k,τ,V H ,V L
[pR (k)− k] + δ [pW (V H)+ (1− p)W (V L)]
subject to (2), (3), (4)
and V H , V L ≥ 0.
(P1)
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The ﬁrst term of the maximand corresponds to the current period’s expected proﬁts.
The second term indicates the expected discounted total value of the ﬁrm at the
beginning of the following period, prior to the liquidation decision.
We now turn to the liquidation decision. Due to the non-convexity introduced
by a positive liquidation value, a stochastic liquidation decision may be optimal in
some states. Allowing for randomizations over the liquidation decision is equivalent
to assuming that at the beginning of every period the lender oﬀers a lottery to the
borrower. The ﬁrm is liquidated with probability α, in which case the borrower
receives Q, and it is kept in operation with probability 1 − α. In the latter case,
the borrower receives Vc, where c is mnemonic for continuation. Then, the function
W (V ) solves the following functional equation:
W (V ) = max
α∈[0,1],Q,Vc
αS + (1− α)Ŵ (Vc)
subject to αQ+ (1− α)Vc = V,
and Q, Vc ≥ 0.
(P2)
Figure 2 illustrates the basic features of the value function. Following standard
dynamic programming arguments, it is easy to show that the W (V ) is concave and
increasing. The domain of V can be partitioned in three regions: (i) a randomization
region, 0 ≤ V ≤ Vr; (ii) a region where there is no current liquidation and total ﬁrm
value increases with the entitlement of the entrepreneur, Vr ≤ V ≤ V˜ ; (iii) a region
where the total value of the ﬁrm equals the value under symmetric information, V ≥
V˜ . We examine each region in turn.
First note that if V = 0 at the liquidation stage, the project is scrapped for sure,
providing a total value W (0) = S. If the ﬁrm were not liquidated and V = 0, no
capital could be advanced in the current period and the ﬁrm would be liquidated for
sure the following period, so Ŵ (0) = δS. For values 0 < V ≤ Vr, it is optimal to give
the entrepreneur a lottery with values of Q = 0 in case of liquidation and Vc = Vr in
case of continuation. The total value of the ﬁrm in this region is given by a linear
10
✲✻
V
W (V )
W˜
V˜
δS
S
Ŵ (V )
Vr
(i) (ii) (iii)
Figure 2: The Value Function.
combination of S and Ŵ (Vr), with weights α (V ) and (1− α (V )), respectively.
The probability of liquidation is α (V ) = (Vr − V ) /Vr. Notice that for V ≤ Vr such
probability is decreasing in the entrepreneur’s value entitlement.
Consider now region (iii), where borrowing constraints cease to bind. The thresh-
old V˜ is deﬁned as the minimum entitlement such that the policy of providing every
period the optimal advancement k∗ is incentive compatible. The value V˜ can be
derived from the following necessary conditions:
V˜ = p (R (k∗)− τ) + δ (pV H + (1− p)V L) ,
τ ≤ δ (V H − V L) ,
V L ≥ V˜ , V H ≥ V˜ .
The smallest value that satisﬁes these constraints is obtained when the incentive
compatibility constraint binds and V L = V˜ . Substituting in the ﬁrst equation, we
obtain
V˜ =
pR (k∗)
1− δ .
Notice that this value entitlement can be implemented by giving the entrepreneur
the eﬃcient capital advancement k∗ in every period, with no need of repayment.
This also corresponds to a situation where the entrepreneur has a positive balance
equal to k∗/ (1− δ) in the bank at an interest rate r = (1− δ) /δ. Such balance is
exactly enough to ﬁnance the project at full scale in all contingencies.
11
The results proved in this section are summarized in the following Proposition.8
Proposition 1 The value function W (V ) is increasing and concave. There exists
values 0 < Vr < V˜ ≡ pR(k∗)1−δ , such that:
1. The firm is liquidated with probability (Vr−V )
Vr
when V ≤ Vr;
2. W (V ) is linear for V < Vr, strictly increasing for V < V˜ and equal to W˜ for
V ≥ V˜ .
3 Properties of the Optimal Lending Contract.
This section characterizes the provisions of the optimal contract when V ∈ [Vr, V˜ )
( region (ii) ). We start with a general proposition that shows that in this region
borrowing constraints bind.
Proposition 2 i) The optimal capital advancement policy k (V ) that solves (P1) is
single valued and continuous. ii) V < V˜ implies k(V ) < k∗; (iii) V ≥ V˜ implies
k (V ) = k∗.
Although this result does not depend on a particular repayment policy, its eco-
nomic intuition is clearest in the case in which τ = R(k).9 Lemma 1 shows that
when this is the case, the incentive compatibility constraint (3) binds for all V < V˜ .
Therefore the level of capital advancement is tied to the spread in equity values
(V H − V L). Due to the concavity of W (V ) this spread is costly so that k < k∗
unless the value function W is ﬂat in the relevant portion.
3.1 Optimal Repayment.
As the total value of the ﬁrm increases with V, there is an eﬃciency gain in delaying
dividend distribution. Given that both agents are risk-neutral and discount future
cash-ﬂows at the same rate, the optimal repayment schedule is the one that allows
the equity value V to reach the threshold V˜ in the shortest possible time. Setting
8The proofs not included in the body of the paper can be found in Appendix.
9Proposition 3 below shows that setting τ = R(k) is indeed optimal.
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τ = R (k) , equation (10) implies V
δ
= pV H + (1− p)V L, which gives the maximum
feasible rate of growth of equity. This is a necessary condition for eﬃciency as
long as V H < V˜ , as indicated by Proposition 3. In the region of values where
V H ≥ V˜ , there is some degree of indeterminacy on the optimal repayment policy.
In particular, among the optimal repayment policies is the one that requires the
entrepreneur to transfer all the cash ﬂows to the lender until his value reaches V˜ ,
and to pay nothing thereafter.
Proposition 3 (i) The following condition is necessary for an optimal contract: if
V H < V˜ then τ = R (k); (ii) It is optimal to set τ = R (k) for all V < V˜ .
Proof. For part (i), consider the case where V H < V˜ . If τ < R (k) , then V H and
τ can be increased in a way that all constraints are still satisﬁed. This results in a
strictly higher value for W
(
V H
)
and, correspondingly, a higher current ﬁrm value
W (V ). Part (ii) follows immediately from the monotonicity of the value function.

3.2 The Evolution of Equity.
The optimal contract generates a stochastic process {Vt} for the value of the en-
trepreneur. In this section we characterize its evolution. By Proposition 3, optimal-
ity implies a unique path for Vt as long as V
H(V ) < V˜ . When this condition does
not hold, the path followed by Vt depends on the choice of dividend distribution
policy. In this section we choose to characterize the evolution of equity in the case
in which τ = R (k) for all V < V˜ .10 This choice, along with the ﬂow equation (2),
implies that Vt < pV
H
t + (1− p)V Lt , so that {Vt} is a submartingale. This process
has two absorbing sets, Vt = 0 and Vt ≥ V˜ . Eventually, either the ﬁrst one is reached
and the ﬁrm is liquidated, or the second one is reached and borrowing constraints
cease forever. In the set 0 < Vt < Vr, the randomization described above takes
place. We will now characterize the process for Vr ≤ Vt < V˜ .
Using the incentive compatibility constraint (3) we can deﬁne an indirect proﬁt
10All relevant properties are independent of the selection used. In particular, this is true for the
optimal capital advancement policy k (V ), which is uniquely determined.
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function as follows:
Π
(
V H − V L) ≡max pR (k)− k
s.t. R (k) ≤ δ (V H − V L) .
It is straightforward to show that Π is strictly concave and strictly increasing for
V H − V L < R(k∗)
δ
, and constant at the value pR (k∗) − k∗ thereafter. For V ≥ Vr,
the optimal contract design problem can be conveniently restated as
W (V ) ≡ max
V H ,V L
Π
(
V H − V L)+ δ [pW (V H)+ (1− p)W (V L)]
s.t. V = δ
(
pV H + (1− p)V L) . (P3)
Since W is concave, it is almost everywhere diﬀerentiable. Let λ denote the
Lagrange multiplier for the constraint. Then, the necessary conditions for optimality
are given by
Π′
(
V H − V L)+ δpW ′ (V H)− δpλ = 0 (5)
−Π′ (V H − V L)+ δ (1− p)W ′ (V L)− δ (1− p)λ = 0 (6)
and by the envelope condition
λ = W ′ (V ) . (7)
Together with Lemma 1, Proposition 2 implies that Π′
(
V H − V L) > 0 for V < V˜ .
Using (5), (6) and (7) we obtain that
W ′
(
V H
)
< W ′ (V ) < W ′
(
V L
)
.
By concavity of the value function, it follows that
V L < V < V H . (8)
The results reached so far are summarized in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 Let V ∈
[
Vr, V˜
)
. If τ = R(k) the following holds: (i) V L < V <
V H ; (ii) V < pV H + (1− p)V L.
Value increases with a good shock and decreases with a bad shock. Moreover, as
Proposition 5 shows, the process {Vt} displays persistence. Lower values in a given
period result in lower future values.
14
Proposition 5 The policy functions V H (V ) and V L (V ) are nondecreasing in V .
Using (2), (3), and τ = R (k), the law of motion for V can be explicitly obtained:
V L =
V − pR (k)
δ
, V H =
V + (1− p)R (k)
δ
. (9)
This shows that in general there is an asymmetry between the change in equity value
following good and bad shocks. In particular, if p and δ are large, V −V L > V H−V,
while the opposite will hold if p < 1/2. Figure 3 shows the qualitative behavior of
the functions V H (V ) and V L (V ). We already know that, for V < Vr, randomizing
over the liquidation decision emerges as an optimal strategy. By Proposition 5 these
functions are nondecreasing for V ≥ Vr. As illustrated in the ﬁgure, starting from
an equity value V0 ∈ [Vr, V˜ ) a ﬁnite sequence of high shocks leads to V˜ . From the
same value, a sequence of low shocks leads to the randomization region.
✲
✻
VV˜
V˜
V L
V H
Vr V0
←
↑
Figure 3: The Dynamics of Equity.
3.3 The Optimal Capital Advancement Policy.
In subsection 2.1 we have shown that, under symmetric information, it would al-
ways be optimal for the lender to provide the entrepreneur with the unconstrained
eﬃcient amount of capital. However, this ceases to be the case when the lender
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cannot observe the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂows. Proposition 2 establishes that borrowing con-
straints are indeed a feature of the optimal long-term contract under asymmetric
information.
An immediate consequence of Proposition 2 is that the allocation of capital
increases with V over some range of values. The numerical results discussed below
suggest that this range may include most of the domain, yet general properties are
hard to derive. Indeed, monotonicity does not hold throughout the whole range of
values. Proposition 6 shows that as equity values get close to the randomization
region, capital advancements actually increase. There is an intuitive explanation for
this result. As a consequence of the option of liquidation, risk taking is encouraged
in a neighborhood of the exit region. This is reﬂected both by the randomized
liquidation decision and the increase in capital advancements. At the other extreme,
capital advancements increase with V in a neighborhood of V˜ .
Proposition 6 There exist value entitlements V ∗ and V ∗∗ , with Vr < V ∗ ≤ V ∗∗ <
V˜ , such that:
1. the policy function k (V ) is non-increasing for V ∈ [Vr, V ∗];
2. the policy function k (V ) is non-decreasing for V ∈
[
V ∗∗, V˜
]
.
We now turn to the results of our numerical experiment.11 Figure 4 shows
how the advancement of working capital responds to good and bad realizations of
the revenue process. The higher curve corresponds to the growth rate of capital,
conditional on success, i.e. k(V
H)
k(V )
. The lower one corresponds to k(V
L)
k(V )
. Even though
k(V ) is not monotone, in the case of our experiment success is always followed by an
increase in the capital invested, while failure always triggers a decline. Also, notice
how the magnitude of the response of investment to cash-ﬂow innovations changes
with V . Percentage changes in capital tend to be larger (in absolute value) for small
values of V and show a tendency to decline as V increases. When V equals the
threshold V˜ , the level of capital invested is independent of cash-ﬂows.
Our results suggest that for a panel of ﬁrms obtaining external ﬁnance through
our contract, investment-cash ﬂow sensitivity would decrease with both size (as
11The parameter values are the same as those listed in Section 4.
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Figure 4: Growth rates of capital conditional on revenue realization.
measured by the level of working capital invested) and age. This relation between
sensitivity and size obtains because, as we have just argued, k(V ) is monotone for
most values of V . The relationship with age stems from the positive correlation
between age and size, outlined in the next section.12
4 Firm Growth and Survival.
This section considers some of the implications of the model for ﬁrm dynamics.
Since detailed implications are very diﬃcult to derive, we complement our analysis
with some numerical results, which suggest that our model is consistent with a set
of widely established empirical ﬁndings. We proceeded to draw a large number of
independent sample paths for ﬁrm shocks, assuming all ﬁrms start at the same initial
value V0 ∈
[
Vr, V˜
)
. Figure 5 summarizes the results of our simulation exercise.13
12In most of the empirical literature we refer to (Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen [15] and Gilchrist
and Himmelberg [18], for instance), investment is regressed on cash-ﬂows and on a predictor of the
expected marginal return of capital. In the case of our model, the equity value Vt is a suﬃcient
statistic for kt and is therefore a natural candidate for the role of control. The coeﬃcient of cash
ﬂows will be positive and statistically signiﬁcant as long as there is at least one period lag between
investment and the control. This is actually the case in all regression speciﬁcations we are aware
of. Conversely, the coeﬃcient will be zero if the two variables are contemporaneous. We thank
Joao Gomes for pointing this out to us.
13Our parametric assumptions are as follows. We set R(k) = k2/5, p = 0.5, δ = 0.99, and
S = 1.5. The discount rate yields an interest rate 1δ − 1 = 1%, which we interpret as the quarterly
interest rate. The time series obtained have been aggregate to generate yearly data, and then
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Throughout this section we identify ﬁrm size with its working capital k. Sample
paths either end with exit or in the unconstrained region. Since k < k∗ whenever
V < V˜ , in average surviving ﬁrms grow with age. Firm age and size are positively
correlated. Both mean and variance of the growth rate decrease systematically with
age, and thus with size. These predictions are qualitatively in line with the ﬁndings
of the recent empirical literature on ﬁrm dynamics. In particular, we refer the reader
to work by Evans [14] and Hall [20].
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Figure 5: Dynamics of Growth and Survival.
As mentioned in the introduction, there is widespread agreement on the ﬁnding
that failure rates decrease with ﬁrm age and size. Moreover, conditional on age,
a larger size implies a lower failure rate. Our model predicts that the conditional
probability of survival increases with the value of the ﬁrm’s equity V .
averaged in the cross-section.
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Proposition 7 Let T be the stopping time corresponding to firm exit. Then, for
every t, Pr (T > t | V ) is strictly increasing in V for V < V˜ and Pr (T =∞ | V ) = 1
for V ≥ V˜ .
A ﬁrm may exit only after having reached the randomization region. This occurs
as the consequence of a series of negative shocks. Since the continuation values V H
and V L are weakly increasing in current value, any history of shocks - including the
outcome of randomization - that leads a ﬁrm with an initial value V to exit will lead
a ﬁrm with a lower initial value to exit too. As in Jovanovic [22], selection occurs
as a consequence of exit. The values of older ﬁrms will tend to be higher, thus
reducing the probability of exit. Given that the initial value V0 > Vr, it may take a
few periods for ﬁrms to exit. We conjecture that our model implies that hazard rates
are likely to increase in the early stages of the ﬁrm lifetime and decrease thereafter.
Figure 5 shows that our simulations are consistent with this conjecture. In addition,
for a range of values where k is increasing in V , our model predicts that failure rates
decrease with ﬁrm size, both unconditionally and controlling for age.
5 Long vs. Short-Term Contracts, Debt Limit,
and Forgiveness.
Can a long term lending contract be replicated by a sequence of short term contracts?
This section provides a general answer to this question. An optimal lending contract
deﬁnes a continuous frontier of values B (V ) = W (V )− V on the domain of equity
values V . The level of debt B is a suﬃcient statistic if and only if the function
B (V ) is strictly decreasing on V . In such case, the inverse function V (B) gives the
entrepreneur’s value as a function of the outstanding debt. The optimal contract
can thus be formulated as a debt management problem, as in Gertler [16]. More
precisely, letting B¯ = supV ∈V B (V ) , the optimal contract satisﬁes the following
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dynamic programming problem:
V (B) = max
k,τ,BH ,BL
p (R (k)− τ) + δ [pV (BH)+ (1− p)V (BL)]
s.t. BL, BH ≤ B¯,
B = pτ − k + δ [pBH + (1− p)BL] , (10)
τ ≤ δ (V (BH)− V (BL)) . (11)
In the region where borrowing constraints are eﬀective, W ′ (V ) = B′ (V ) + 1 > 0.
This implies that B′ (V ) > −1 and thus V ′ (B) < −1. As a consequence, V (BH)−
V
(
BL
)
> BL − BH > 0. Substituting the incentive constraint (11) in (10), we
obtain that
B = pτ − k + δBL + δp (BH −BL)
> pτ − k + δBL − δ (V (BH)− V (BL))
= −k + δBL,
where the last equality holds since the incentive constraint binds. From this in-
equality it follows that
BL <
B + k
δ
. (12)
The right hand side of (12) corresponds to the outstanding debt in the following
period, if no payment was made. This inequality implies that the contract provides
explicitly for some debt forgiveness. This is of course compensated by debt falling
by less than the value of repayment in the high state. These remarks apply even
when B (V ) is not strictly decreasing on all its domain, when restricted to the region
where it is.
It is easy to see that by rolling over the debt, a sequence of short term con-
tingent debt contracts is suﬃcient to implement the solution of the above dynamic
program. There is no need for a long term contract. The condition that B (V ) is
strictly decreasing in the domain of the contract is equivalent to the contract being
renegotiation-proof. Hence, renegotiation proofness characterizes ﬁnancial contracts
that can be implemented by one-period contingent debt contracts.
This conclusion does not necessarily apply to our model, since for low values of
equity it is possible that B′ (V ) > 0. This is the case, for example, when S = 0
20
and R′ (0) = ∞. However, for a suﬃciently high scrap value, B (V ) will be strictly
decreasing. To see this, ﬁrst note that by concavity W ′ (V ) is decreasing, and so is
B′ (V ) = W ′ (V )−1. Hence, B (V ) will be strictly decreasing if and onlyW ′ (V ) ≤ 1
in the randomization area. This will occur for high levels of S.14 Incidentally, this
condition is equivalent to saying that the liquidation decision is renegotiation-proof.
As indicated above, there is a maximum level of sustainable debt B¯, which
corresponds to the lowest level of equity in the region where B′ (V ) < 0. There are
two possible cases: the corresponding value of equity is either zero or positive. In
the ﬁrst case, the contract is renegotiation proof and B¯ = S. The entrepreneur’s
debt is fully collateralized. In the second case, B¯ > S. The debt can exceed the
value of collateral.
The results of this section are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 8 i) The optimal contract can be implemented by a sequence of one-
period contingent debt contracts if and only if it is renegotiation-proof. ii) in any
region where there is no incentive for renegotiation the contract involves debt for-
giveness in the low state. iii) The maximum sustainable debt B¯ ≥ S, where B¯ = S
if and only if the contract is renegotiation-proof.
6 The Role of Collateral.
The scrap value S constitutes the resale value of the project and thus its collateral.
In this section we investigate how an increase in the value of S aﬀects the lending
contract.
Obviously, a larger S implies a larger surplus W for every V < V˜ . In turn, this
implies that the set of pairs (I0,M) that insure ﬁnancial feasibility is also larger.
Our analysis in Section 7 also implies that when the lending market is competitive
a larger collateral translates into an higher initial equity value V0.
A more subtle yet interesting implication can be inferred by inspection of Figure
6.15 As shown in the top panel, an increase in S decreases the degree of concavity
14It is obviously true for S = W˜ , since in that case W (V ) = W˜ and W ′ (V ) = 0. By continuity,
it will also hold for lower S.
15The right-most panel of the ﬁgure is the result of a simulation exercise conducted as described
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of the function W (V ). As a consequence, one may expect the capital advancement
k to increase for every V < V˜ . There is an intuitive explanation. As explained
in Section 3.3, higher capital advancements are costly since by lowering V L they
increase the risk of future (ineﬃcient) liquidation. A larger collateral S makes this
risk less costly, resulting in a higher capital advancement. Figure 6 illustrates this
eﬀect. In the case of our numerical experiment, the elasticity of capital advancement
to changes in the value of collateral can be larger than 1.
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Figure 6: Comparative Statics with respect to the value of collateral.
It is also of interest to study the eﬀect of diﬀerent collateral values on ﬁrm sur-
vival. In this respect, the analysis that we have conducted so far is inconclusive.
While a larger S makes liquidation more appealing, it also has the eﬀects of in-
creasing the initial equity V0 and the continuation value of the project.
16 Figure
6 illustrates that from our simulation exercise does not emerge an ordering of the
survival functions. However, in the limit survival increases with S.
in Section 4. The initial equity values were pinned down by assuming that the lending market is
competitive.
16The analysis carried out in Section 7 implies that if the lending market is competitive, the
initial equity V0 is larger when the value function W (V ) is uniformly less concave.
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7 Financial Feasibility.
Our previous analysis did not consider the initial distribution of surplus. Letting V0
denote the initial value to the entrepreneur, B0 (V0) = W (V0) − V0 is the value to
the lender. Given the entrepreneur’s initial net worth M < I0, the project requires
an initial contribution from the lender I0−M. The lender will be willing to provide
ﬁnancing to the entrepreneur, as long as V0 satisﬁes
[W (V0)− V0]− [I0 −M ] ≥ 0.
The entrepreneur will be willing to invest as long as V0 > M . The project is
ﬁnancially feasible if there exists an initial allocation of value (B0, V0) such that
both parties are willing to invest.
If the maximum sustainable debt B¯ < I0 − M, the project is not ﬁnancially
feasible. Otherwise, let V denote the largest V0 ≥ 0 such that B (V0) = I0 −M.
The project is ﬁnancially feasible if an only if V ≥M. The value V also deﬁnes the
equilibrium starting level of equity in a market with competing lenders. This initial
equity V is strictly increasing in the net worth of the entrepreneur M .
It is instructive to examine again the role of collateral. As indicated above,
for large collateral, B¯ = B (0) and initial lending is constrained by the value of
collateral. However, when the collateral is relatively low, initial lending will exceed
its value. In the latter case, the contract cannot be implemented by one-period
contingent debt. This suggests the importance of long term lending when the value
of collateral is small compared to initial setup costs, which is the case for investments
that involve large sunk costs.
8 Unobservable Investment.
This section considers an alternative source of moral hazard. We assume that the
lender can monitor the outcome of the project each period but not the use of funds.
The entrepreneur faces an outside opportunity that provides utility Va (k) . We as-
sume that Va is strictly increasing and strictly concave. The incentive compatibility
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constraint for this problem is given by
pR (k)− τ + δ (pV H + (1− p)V L) ≥ Va (k) + δV L.
All our previous analysis still goes through, once we deﬁne
Π
(
V H − V L) ≡max pR (k)− k
s.t. Va (k) ≤ δp
(
V H − V L) .
Our previous analysis uses only two properties of the indirect proﬁt function, namely
monotonicity and concavity. The ﬁrst property is immediate from the above deﬁ-
nition. Suﬃcient conditions for concavity are given in Lemma 2 in the appendix.
Notice that in the special case where Va (k) = pR (k), the two indirect proﬁt func-
tions are identical.
9 A Comparison to Incomplete Enforcement.
Several papers in the literature on ﬁnancing contracts consider an alternative for-
mulation, where borrowing constraints result from incomplete enforcement. There
are no informational asymmetries, but borrowers can default on their debts and
take an outside option. This section provides a sharp distinction between the two
alternative approaches.
The incomplete enforcement model that we describe is the natural counterpart
to our moral hazard model. Take the same revenue function R (k) and process for
the shocks. There is no asymmetric information, so the lender observes the outcome
of the project. However, the entrepreneur can default by keeping the revenues
and not paying back the loan. The project is then liquidated, giving the lender
the liquidation value S. By defaulting, the entrepreneur gets a value R (k) if the
productive state had realized. Otherwise, there is no value from defaulting.
Letting V H denote the continuation value in the productive state, the no-default
constraint is given by
R (k) ≤ δV H .
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Deﬁne now the indirect proﬁt function as
Π
(
V H
) ≡max
k
pR (k)− k
s.t. R (k) ≤ δV H .
The optimal no-default contract solves the following dynamic programming equa-
tion:
W (V ) = max
V H ,V L
Π
(
V H
)
+ δ
[
pW
(
V H
)
+ (1− p)W (V L)]
s.t. V ≥ δ (pV H + (1− p)V L) .
This problem is the analogue of (P3). The only diﬀerence is that V L is not an
argument of the indirect proﬁt function. First order conditions for the choice of
continuation values are given by
Π′
(
V H
)
+ δpW ′
(
V H
)− δpλ = 0
W ′
(
V L
)− λ = 0.
Using the envelope condition λ = W ′ (V ), it follows that
W ′
(
V H
)
< W ′ (V ) = W ′
(
V L
)
,
which implies that
V L = V < V H .
The equity value increases in response to good shocks but never decreases! As a
consequence, the ﬁrm never shrinks nor exits.
10 Final Remarks.
There exist a large variety of lending contracts with implicit and unwritten con-
tingencies and clauses. This makes it very diﬃcult to assess directly the empirical
implications of borrowing constraints. Existing empirical tests are indirect, focus-
ing mostly on the sensitivity of investment to cash-ﬂows and on other features of
ﬁrm dynamics. It is our view that theory can contribute to this debate through
a better understanding of borrowing constraints and their empirical implications.
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This requires theories that derive borrowing constraints from ﬁrst principles and are
suitable for the analysis of ﬁrm dynamics. Gertler [16] was clearly a move in this
direction. Our paper contributes to this research program.
We have chosen to keep the model as simple as possible, with the minimal
elements needed to derive endogenous borrowing constraints in a dynamic setup. In
spite of its simplicity, our model matches most of the qualitative properties of ﬁrm
dynamics that have been recently documented. Moral hazard thus seems to be a
good foundation for the analysis of borrowing constraints.
Our model is also useful to better understand the value and importance of
long term lending contracts. We have shown that projects with high collateral
are renegotiation-proof and are implementable through a sequence of one-period
(contingent) loans. Borrowing is limited by the value of the collateral itself. In
contrast, when the collateral is low relative to the total value of the project, initial
lending can exceed its value. In the latter case, the optimal contract requires com-
mitment of the lender to no-renegotiation and cannot be implemented by a sequence
of short-term contracts. Long term lending is thus more valuable for investments
that involve high sunk costs.
The restriction to renegotiation-proof contracts can limit lending opportunities.
In some cases, it could lead to the extreme of making the project ﬁnancially in-
feasible. The ability of lenders to commit to long term contracts can thus have
considerable value. The same can be said of institutions that facilitate reputation
building and the establishment of long-term relationships.
It is interesting to compare the implications of our model to theories of incom-
plete contracts where borrowing constraints arise from incomplete enforcement, as
in Albuquerque and Hopenhayn [1]. We have shown that, diﬀerently from our setup,
in the incomplete enforcement analogue of our model ﬁrm size never decreases. In
the environment studied by Albuquerque and Hopenhayn [1], the stochastic struc-
ture is such that ﬁrm size does decrease in response to low productivity shocks.
Conditional on a given productivity shock, however, size never decreases. While
these these predictions are diﬃcult to test, we still conjecture that the two classes
of models would diﬀer considerably in their quantitative implications.
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In the recent past, many scholars have conjectured the existence of a causation
link between ﬁnancing constraints and the sensitivity of investment to cash ﬂows. In
this paper we have provided a model that endogenously generates this link. However,
the observed sensitivity may also be due to a simple selection process, as in the
models of Jovanovic [22] and Alti [2]. In either one of these papers, entrepreneurs
start out not knowing the productivity of their ﬁrms and learn about it by observing
the cash-ﬂows realizations. With Bayesian learning, an increase (decrease) in cash-
ﬂows prompts an upward (downward) revision of the ﬁrm’s expected productivity
level, and therefore adjustments in capital expenditures of the same sign. It is of
obvious interest to develop testable predictions that can help to discriminate between
the two theories. We will discuss two potential candidates. In our model the value
of equity is a suﬃcient statistic for investment. The investment-cash-ﬂow sensitivity
varies with age only because age is correlated with size. Controlling for size, age
should not matter. In the cases of Jovanovic and Alti, exactly the opposite occurs.
The investment-cash ﬂow sensitivity varies with size only because it is correlated
with age. Further, consider the role of sunk costs. In Jovanovic [22], the level of
sunk costs aﬀects the degree of selection, but should not have a considerable impact
on ﬁrm dynamics. In contrast, in our model higher sunk costs imply that ﬁrms start
smaller and thus exhibit higher average rates of growth. Our analysis also suggests
that a higher liquidation value can lead to higher variance in growth rates.
We have assumed that both lender and borrower are risk neutral. In spite of this,
risk considerations arise in the optimal contract design as a result of the interaction
of limited liability and a concave revenue function. The resulting degree of risk
aversion is not constant and depends on the entrepreneur’s equity. We ﬁnd that
risk taking is encouraged at the extremes, close to the liquidation area and for
large values of equity. In our model the project and its risk are taken exogenously.
Allowing for risk to be a choice variable is an interesting direction in which our
theory could be extended.
There are many other interesting extensions. Multiple shocks can be easily ac-
commodated, as in Quadrini [25]. A model with partial liquidation (downsizing)
has been studied by DeMarzo and Fishman [11]. The dynamics of capacity uti-
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lization may be studied adopting the timing of Gertler [16]. Finally, we suggest
that our model may have interesting applications in macroeconomics. Starting with
Bernanke and Gertler [7], there has been a growing interest in understanding to
what extent various forms of frictions in ﬁnancial markets may generate and/or
amplify macroeconomic ﬂuctuations. However, the ﬁnancial arrangements that are
considered in this literature are never intertemporally optimal, meaning that con-
tracts’ provisions are not contingent on all public information. The only exception
is recent work by Cooley, Quadrini, and Marimon [10], that embed the model by
Albuquerque and Hopenhayn [1] in a general equilibrium framework. It would deﬁ-
nitely be of interest to perform a similar exercise with the model developed in this
paper, and then contrast the predictions generated by the two approaches.
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A Appendix - Proofs and Lemmas.
Proposition 1.
Proof. All but one of the statements of the proposition were proven in the text. It
is left to show thatW (V ) is strictly increasing for V < V˜ . By contradiction, assume
that there exists a pair (V ′, V ) such that V ′ < V < V˜ and W (V ′) = W (V ). Then,
by concavity of the value function it must be that W (V ′) = W (V ) = W˜ , which is a
contradiction. 
Proposition 2.
Proof. i) It follows from standard dynamic programming arguments, since (P1)
deﬁnes a concave programming problem which is strictly concave in k. ii) By con-
tradiction, assume that there exists some V < V˜ such that k(V ) = k∗. Then, since
W˜ = pR(k
∗)−k∗
1−δ , W (V ) = (1 − δ)W˜ + δ
[
pW (V H) + (1− p)W (V L)]. By Proposi-
tion 1, it must be the case that W (V ) < W˜ , and therefore either V H < V˜ , or
V L < V˜ , or both. If W ′(V H) < W ′(V L), consider lowering slightly k and τ in
such a way that R(k) − τ does not change. The marginal eﬀect of this change on
the surplus is zero, since pR′(k∗) = 1. However, it has the eﬀect of relaxing the
incentive compatibility constraint. By Jensen inequality, total surplus can be in-
creased by lowering V H and raising V L, in such a way that the promise-keeping
constraint still hold. If W ′(V H) = W ′(V L) then the value function is linear over
the range
(
V L, V H
)
. By Proposition 1, it must be that V H < V˜ . Therefore, by
Proposition 3 it follows that τ = R(k∗). Thus, pV H + (1 − p)V L = V
δ
. By lin-
earity, it follows that pW (V H) + (1 − p)W (V L) = W (V
δ
). On the other hand,
W (V ) < W˜ implies
[
pW (V H) + (1− p)W (V L)] > W (V ). Summarizing, we have
that
[
pW (V H) + (1− p)W (V L)] = W (V
δ
) > W (V ) >
[
pW (V H) + (1− p)W (V L)],
which is a contradiction. iii) Again by Proposition 1, W (V ) = pR(k
∗)−k∗
1−δ for V ≥ V˜ .
The only way such surplus can be achieved is by setting k(V ) = k∗. 
Lemma 1 When τ = R(k), then the IC constraint (3) binds for every V < V˜ .
Proof. By Proposition 2, V < V˜ implies that k (V ) < k∗. For the sake of con-
tradiction, assume there exists V such that R (k) < δ
(
V H − V L). Then by strict
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monotonicity of the revenue function it is possible to increase the surplus of the
match strictly just by raising k. But this contradicts optimality. 
Proposition 5.
Proof. We begin by proving that the function V H(V ) is nondecreasing. Take any V ,
V < V˜ . Consider raising V . By concavity of the value function, W ′(V ) decreases
weakly. By contradiction, assume that V H is now strictly lower. It follows that
W ′(V H) is weakly higher. For constraint (2) to hold, V L must increase strictly.
Since Π is strictly concave in the relevant range, Π′(V H − V L) must also increase
strictly. However, this contradicts condition (5). The proof of monotonicity of
V L(V ) is very similar. Take any V , V < V˜ . Consider raising V . By concavity
of W , W ′(V ) decreases weakly. By contradiction, assume that V L is now strictly
lower. It follows that W ′(V L) is weakly higher. For constraint (2) to hold, V H must
increase strictly. Since Π is strictly concave in the relevant range, Π′(V H − V L)
increases strictly. However, this contradicts condition (6). 
Proposition 6.
Proof. Combining conditions (5) and (6), one obtains that a necessary condition for
the optimal contract is p(1− p) (W ′(V L)−W ′(V H)) = Π′(V H − V L) = 1− 1
pR′(k) .
1) By Proposition 5, V L (Vr) < Vr. By continuity of the function V
L (·), there ex-
ists V > Vr such that V
L (V ) < Vr. Combining this fact with monotonicity of V
H (·)
and concavity of the value function yields the prediction that
(
W
′ (
V L
)−W ′(V H))
is non-decreasing and thus k (·) non-increasing on [Vr, V ].
2) We know that V H
(
V˜
)
> V˜ . By continuity of the function V H (·), there exists
V < V˜ such that V H (V ) > V˜ . Combining this fact with monotonicity of V L (·) and
concavity of the value function yields the prediction that
(
W
′ (
V L
)−W ′ (V H)) is
non-increasing and thus k (·) non-decreasing on
[
V, V˜
]
. 
Lemma 2 The sign of Π′′
(
V H − V L) is given by the sign of pR′′(k)
pR′(k)−1 − V
′′
0 (k)
V ′0(k)
.
Proof. It is immediate, by implicit diﬀerentiation of Π. 
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